2018-04-04 11:48:10 +10:00
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This is a full reference on those
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functions and fields exposed by the
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kernel to processes and libraries.
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Firstly, it is important to note that
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a process runs within a coroutine.
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This allows a highly "traditional"
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form of mixing async and synchronous
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code with event-loop nesting and
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such designs. If this is not to your
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taste then you can just use one, not
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nested event loop.
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As it runs in a coroutine, events are
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received via coroutine.yield() -
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sandboxers beware! You may have to
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use coroutine.running() in order to
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successfully hide the implementation
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details of your sandbox (also events
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and potentially accesses headed in
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its direction...)
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An example KittenOS NEO program,
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solely using kernel APIs,
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that you will likely have to kill:
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neo.scheduleTimer(os.uptime() + 1)
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while true do
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local ev = coroutine.yield()
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if ev == "k.timer" then
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neo.emergency("Hello...")
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neo.scheduleTimer(os.uptime() + 1)
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end
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end
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This will say "Hello..." via the
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neo.emergency mechanism once every
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second, independently of anything
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else on the system.
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While this is obviously not a sane
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sys-init for actual use, if you have
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a disk that you can copy the kernel
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to and a copy of this, it might make
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a fun experiment.
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The way to exit the program is to
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return from your process's main
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function.
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The first field to note is:
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_VERSION: _VERSION from the host.
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The following are just wrapMeta'd
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host libraries (*: altered):
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math, table, string, unicode*,
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coroutine, os*, debug
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unicode is extended with:
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safeTextFormat(s, p):
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Takes a string s, and a position p,
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(the position is optional, and is
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assumed to be 1 otherwise)
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and returns a space-padded string,
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with a space after each wide char
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to make unicode.len & co. act in
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screen units, along with the
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position translated.
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undoSafeTextFormat(s):
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Takes a string in padded-widechar
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format, and gets rid of the pad.
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Note that if padding is *missing*,
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wide characters become spaces.
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This leaves a string that's usually
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safe to pass to a GPU without any
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odd graphical glitches.
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2018-04-07 06:05:47 +10:00
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The KittenOS NEO kernel also reserves
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the ability to take advantage of any
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full de-UTF16'd support for Unicode
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available on the system, but will
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not include such support as a shim
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for memory usage reasons.
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Programs that thus try to work around
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this problem should delegate this
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task to a library, in a separate
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package, which can then be updated
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as-needed if and when the issue is
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resolved.
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os is replaced with (wrapMeta'd):
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2018-04-04 11:48:10 +10:00
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totalMemory = computer.totalMemory,
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freeMemory = computer.freeMemory,
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energy = computer.energy,
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maxEnergy = computer.maxEnergy,
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clock = os.clock, date = os.date,
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difftime = os.difftime,
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time = os.time,
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uptime = computer.uptime,
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address = computer.address
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2018-04-07 06:05:47 +10:00
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The following are just host functions
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(*: wrapped for security - these
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functions detect metatable abuse):
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2018-04-04 11:48:10 +10:00
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assert, ipairs, load, next*,
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pairs, pcall, xpcall, select,
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type, error, tonumber, tostring,
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setmetatable, getmetatable*,
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rawset*, rawget, rawlen, rawequal
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2018-04-07 06:05:47 +10:00
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(NOTE: Before you consider that load
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has no checks: The policy regarding
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load is taken from the host system.
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Which means bytecode loading is
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almost certainly off. If it's not
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off, then this is the user's fault,
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as doing so is marked as a security
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risk for very obvious reasons.
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As for trying to use the environment
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to bypass a metatable, I tested.
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Metatables do apply to environments,
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including global creation.
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There is no way to win.)
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2018-04-04 11:48:10 +10:00
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"require" and "neo" are the parts of
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the environment where a NEO-specific
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nature presents itself.
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require takes a string, and returns
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the value returned by the library at
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"libs/" .. str .. ".lua" on the
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primary disk.
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2018-04-07 06:05:47 +10:00
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Since R2, the value is automatically
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wrapMeta'd, just in case.
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Before R2, libraries did this on
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their own, but this caused NEO-only
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code to crop up in libraries that
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did not need NEO-only code.
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2018-04-04 11:48:10 +10:00
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The library name must be a valid path
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component, and the library path must
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also be valid - see
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ensurePathComponent, ensurePath for
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more info.
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The "neo" table is where most of the
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NEO-specificness is hiding, which is
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probably shown by its name.
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It is also where libraries differ to
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processes, as libraries get a subset
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of the table.
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For libraries, it contains:
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emergency: Equals ocemu.log, if
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available on the system. Else, NOP.
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readBufSize: The readBufSize kernel
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configuration value. Default: 2048.
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Adjusting this in the kernel allows
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adjusting how much the system will
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read at any given time, which can
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have non-obvious memory usage
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effects.
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Do note, following this limit is
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not a requirement and is not
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enforced - it's not a security
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matter, just optimization/memory.
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wrapMeta: A function that takes a
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value, and wraps it in such a way
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as to be immutable, returning the
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wrapped value.
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This is the first line of defense
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against memory use - by using this
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to protect a table, the result can
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be shared between untrusted code.
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listProcs: A function that returns a
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table of processes. Index is ipairs
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-friendly, values are:
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{pid, pkg, cpuUsageInSeconds}
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listApps: Returns an ipairs-friendly
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list of applications on the system,
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such as:
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{"app-out-of-sight-is-out-of-mind",
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"svc-i-see-the-ones-that-play"}
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listLibs: Returns an ipairs-friendly
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list of libraries on the system,
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such as:
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{"fmttext",
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"braille"}
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totalIdleTime: Returns the current
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kernel idle time total, useful for
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measuring current CPU usage, and in
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turn comparing to application CPU
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time to get various statistics.
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ensurePath: (s, root)
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Attempts to verify the
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safety of a path, and errors if any
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aspect seems incorrect.
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The root must be a prefix to the
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path, and the path must follow a
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strict standardized form that is
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guaranteed to always be supported
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and handled in the same way on any
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OC system.
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Essentially, "//" must not occur,
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and all "[^/]+" matches must be
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valid path components.
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ensurePathComponent: (s)
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Ensures that a string is a safe
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filename via a character list and
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some special filename checks.
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UTF-8 characters are just flat out
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disallowed until someone can give
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me proof they won't blow up
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something somewhere.
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(This restriction is Windows's
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fault - I can't trust the encoding
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mess to not find some new and
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imaginative way of breaking
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filenames, so I'd rather that they
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get avoided until someone can try
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actually using them.)
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This does NOT ACCOUNT for *all* the
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Windows total nonsense (aux, com1)
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because if OC doesn't cover up
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that then you're kinda doomed.
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ensureType: (v, ts)
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Checks that a value is of a given
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type, and errors otherwise. If the
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type is "table", it also errors if
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a metatable exists.
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The additional things available to
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processes are those things that
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require a process to use:
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pid: A field that specifies the
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process ID of this process.
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Harmless, but not entirely useful.
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dead: Actually a field, that isn't
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set at first, but is set later to
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indicate deadness. Useful if your
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process does anything that might
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lead to functions being called in
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the afterlife, such as providing an
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API.
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executeAsync: Function that takes
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an app name (aka: pkg), and a
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set of arguments to give it.
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NOTE: sys- apps cannot be started
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from non sys- apps no matter how
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hard you try, without k.root
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alterations to runProgramPolicy.
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Your process pkg and ID is
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prepended to the arguments.
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NOTE: This uses the result, err
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return format, except for security
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errors in which case it uses a
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full error, because you might just
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ignore the return value.
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A successful result is the PID.
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executeExt: Like executeAsync, but
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firstly, synchronous, and secondly,
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with an extra first parameter that
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contains a function to call on
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events encountered during the time.
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As for the return values, it tries
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to emulate os.execute, so it
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returns -1 & reason on load error,
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and 0 & death-reason otherwise.
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execute: executeExt, but with the
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first parameter set to a blank
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function.
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requestAccessAsync: A function that
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takes an access ID (aka 'perm') as
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a string (see kn-perms for info),
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and starts a security request that
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is responded to with a
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k.securityresponse such as:
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"k.securityresponse", perm, obj
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requestAccess: A function with
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(perm, handler) as the arguments -
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runs requestAccessAsync, then sends
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events to handler (if any) while
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waiting for the response.
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requireAccess: requestAccess, but
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(perm, reason) - the reason is used
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in an error if the access cannot
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be gained.
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scheduleTimer: Given an os.uptime
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value, creates a timer and returns
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a completely meaningless table that
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is never touched by the kernel
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directly, called the "tag".
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The resulting event:
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"k.timer", tag, time, ofs
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These events are ONLY EVER sent as
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a consequence of this function,
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and this can be relied on safely.
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NOTE: Setting timers too far in the
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future has effects on system
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stability. So does using memory,
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and there's no way for me to stop
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that, either. So long as the timer
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is reached, alive or dead, things
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will work, but spamming timers has
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the consequence of memory use,
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and timers stick around after the
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process that owns them is dead.
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With that, I hope I have documented
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the kernel's interface to programs.
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2018-04-05 02:15:51 +10:00
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-- This is released into
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the public domain.
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-- No warranty is provided,
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implied or otherwise.
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