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OC-KittenOS/repository/docs/kn-intro

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The KittenOS NEO Kernel,
aka "init.lua", or as I like to call
it, "KNOSKRNL", is what happens when
someone tries to write a microkernel
in Lua, and make it efficient.
Obviously, the result is not entirely
what would be expected from a kernel
at all, nevermind a microkernel.
In particular, it borrows an
important concept, specifically fast
yet secure IPC.
By which I of course mean that the
IPC consists of programs giving Lua
values to each other directly, and
the kernel giving the programs some
mechanisms to help secure this.
Not what you expected, I assume.
The "kn-" group of documents is about
the KittenOS NEO kernel.
This is specifically ONLY about the
kernel, and only about features the
kernel provides directly.
As the kernel provides many things to
everything under it, I believe this
is of great use.
It's now time for the notes about the
kernel side of the boot process.
Firstly, the startup of sys-init is
unlike any other - specifically, it
has a nil callerPid/callerPkg pair.
This is because no application ran a
function to create the process - it
was created by the kernel.
Secondly, here's what goes on in the
kernel when an Access is registered,
and when it's accessed:
1. The service requests access with
an AID starting with "r.".
2. The security policy presumably
accepts the registration.
3. A blank registration in the table
"accesses" is made immediately.
This registration always fails to
be retrieved, but exists.
4. A function is returned to reset
the registration.
5. The service calls the function,
thus the registration is now
completed.
6. The user-process requests access
with an AID starting with "x.",
everything after matching that
in the "r." registration.
7. The security policy presumably
accepts the use of that API.
8. The callback in the registration
is called.
Its first return value is sent
back to the user-process.
If it errors, then nil is given
instead (the error is not sent).
Thirdly, the security policy is set
by getting the kernel global table
with "k.root", and then changing the
global "securityPolicy".
Given this operation is only ever
performed once in typical use, and
having control over it is equivalent
to instant root, it seems fitting
that it is done this way.
(Making absolute power absolute is
also why the kernel loves globals.)
Finally, the kernel prevents those
processes that aren't "sys-" from
calling "sys-" processes.
-- This is released into
the public domain.
-- No warranty is provided,
implied or otherwise.